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Macroeconomic Instability in Argentina, 
1963-2003*
Valeria Arza1
ConiCet y Cenit
Resumen
La inestabilidad macroeconómica disuade los planes 
de inversión debido a las interferencias que genera en la 
posibilidad de anticipar el comportamiento de variables 
claves del contexto. Este trabajo sugiere que Argentina 
tuvo históricamente una inestabilidad macroeconómi-
ca intensa. En los 39 años de política económica estu-
diados, hubo 19 cambios de orientación. Los ciclos de 
orientación ortodoxa duraron, en promedio, alrededor 
de tres años y medio, mientras que apenas superaron el 
año los ciclos de orientación heterodoxa. En consecuen-
cia, los ciclos económicos -calculados en base al PBI- 
fueron cortos (3 años) y la volatilidad de los indicadores 
macroeconómicos fue internacionalmente alta.
Abstract
Macroeconomic instability discourages investment 
plans due to the interference it generates in anticipat-
ing the behaviour of key variables of the context. This 
study suggests that the Argentinean macroeconomic 
setting was, historically, highly unstable. During the 39 
years of economic policy studied in this paper, there 
were 19 reversals in policy orientations. Cycles char-
acterised by orthodox policies lasted about three and 
a half years on average, while heterodox cycles hardly 
overcame the year. Consequently, economic cycles 
-calculated on the basis of GDP- were short (3 years) 
and volatility of macroeconomic indicators was inter-
nationally high.
1. varza@fund-cenit.org.ar
* The author is grateful to Laura Goldberg, Paula Español and Nick von-Tunzelmann who commented on previ-
ous version of this paper. All errors and omissions remain mine.
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1. Introduction
“In the Argentinean economy, the long term does not exist”
(Juan Carlos Pugliese, Argentinean Minister for the Economy for two 
years in the Arturo Illia government, and just over one month in the Raúl 
Alfonsín government) 
This paper illustrates the historical pattern of 
macroeconomic uncertainty in Argentina, which has 
two bases. First, a focus on changes in overall policy 
illustrates one aspect of instability at the institutional 
level, that lack of consistency and stability in policy de-
sign was the rule in Argentina, which may have had an 
impact on individual behaviour. To illustrate this, the 
main changes in macroeconomic policy orientation 
since the 1960s are summarised in Section 2. Second, 
contrasting time-series of various macroeconomic in-
dicators characterising the international and domestic 
contexts of Argentina and the UK will put into perspec-
tive the degree of volatility that has affected the Argen-
tinean economy since the mid 1960s. This is pursued 
in Section 3.
The evidence presented here provides the empiri-
cal underpinning for the claim that Argentina could be 
considered as a country that has gone through macro-
economic structural uncertainty, manifested in both a 
policy setting that was unstable and a great volatility 
of virtually every macroeconomic indicator that can be 
examined. 
This characterisation of Argentina’s economic 
history, where unexpected changes in the framework 
conditions were more often the rule than the excep-
tion, may have contributed to developing a social di-
mension of individual behaviour that has been particu-
larly favourable for the short-term, as many analysts 
argued (see, among others: Arza, 2005a; b; Fanelli and 
Frenkel, 1994; Kosacoff, 1996; 2000; Kosacoff and López, 
2002; Porta, 1996).
2. Argentina 1963-2003: the historical 
context from a macroeconomic policy 
perspective
2.1. The scope of the historical survey
This section provides a synthetic review of macro-
economic policy in Argentina since the 1960s, to high-
light the instability that occurred at the policy design 
level by describing the sudden fluctuations in policy 
orientation from orthodoxy to heterodoxy. The reasons 
why these policies were implemented or changed, and 
their social, political or economic consequences, are 
not discussed here.2
It is difficult to find any pattern of policy orienta-
tion in Argentina beyond a swing from one extreme 
to the other. There is no clear relationship between 
economic orientation and political orientation. Au-
thoritarian and democratic governments introduced 
similar macroeconomic policies, whose orientation 
showed similar swings. Moreover, during periods of 
democratic rule, it was difficult for the population to 
vote according to rational economic thought, given 
that in different periods the economic orientations 
chosen by a single party could be wildly contrasting, or 
candidates once elected could change their orientation 
dramatically. Furthermore, the same government (and 
in some cases also the same minister for the economy) 
could put into practice opposing policies during their 
mandate.3 
The present survey summarises the set of eco-
nomic policy reforms that received the approval of the 
multilateral organisations that reside in Washington, 
primarily the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank (WB), jointly named here as Interna-
tional Financial Institutions (IFIs). 
Since the early 1950s the IMF has tied policy con-
ditionality to their stand-by loans.4 In the 1980s the 
2. For a more analytical discussion of economic policy in Argentina see: Damill (2005); Damill and Fanelli (1993); Damill and Frenkel (1987); Heymann (2000) and 
Schvarzer (1999); while a very encompassing and complete account of the facts concerning economic policy-making can be found in Gerchunoff and Llach (2003).
3.  In a similar vain, Spiller and Tommasi (2003: 283) claim that “there is enough circumstantial evidence to characterize Argentina’s public policies as often being too 
volatile, other times too rigid, showing inconsistencies over time and across policy dimensions, and more generally, of low and heterogeneous qualities”. In the paper, 
the authors argue that efficiency in policy making is the result of intertemporal political agreements, with the political institutions being the facilitators (or not) of 
those agreements. Using transactional cost theory applied to politics, the authors discuss the reasons why Argentinean political system had a traditional incapacity 
to develop those intertemporal agreements. 
4. Argentina joined the IMF and the WB in 1956. In 1958 the country made an agreement with the IMF that included conditions of the kind recommended by the 
Washington Consensus (see below), e.g. reducing the fiscal deficit (Gerchunoff and Llach, 2003: 261). The first loan obtained from the WB was in 1961 (related to road 
projects) but adjustment loans related to macroeconomic policy (trade and financial reforms) were first made in 1987-1988 in the context of the WB’s Baker Plan.
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WB launched its Structural Adjustment Loans,5 which 
openly stated that funds from that source would be de-
pendent on the recipient country agreeing to certain 
policy reforms (Easterly, 2005: 2). Since then, the role 
of the WB has become indistinguishable from that of 
the IMF (Ranis, 1997), or less cynically it could be said 
that they have become very complementary, and have 
coordinated their relationship with the developing 
world in pursuit of common principles. Thus, although 
the Washington Consensus (WC) adopted its name and 
current structure only in 1989, its principles were estab-
lished long ago, rooted in the aftermath of the break-up 
of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, if not before. 
For the sake of simplicity, I refer in this paper to 
‘orthodoxy in policy orientation’ when policy prescrip-
tions largely agree with the spirit of the WC. According 
to John Williamson the three main ideas behind the 
WC are: “macroeconomic discipline”, “market econo-
my”, and “openness to the world” (Williamson, 2002: 2) 
and the WC’s ten main recommendations are (see for 
example: Williamson, 1998; 2000; 2002): 
1. Fiscal discipline.
2. Reordering public expenditure priorities: a so-
cial state more than an interventionist state (e.g. cut-
ting down subsidies to production and increasing basic 
health and education expenditures).
3. Tax reform: broad tax base with moderate rates.
4. Financial liberalisation: liberalisation of the in-
ternal banking system. 
5. Competitive exchange rate: ‘competitive’ can 
be interpreted in various ways. For the purposes of 
distinguishing between orthodox and heterodox policy 
orientations, and corresponding with the laissez-faire 
principle, only flexible rate regimes will be considered 
here as being an orthodox orientation. In practical 
terms this is in line with Williamson’s original WC, as 
fixed rate regimes turned out more often than other-
wise to trigger uncompetitive exchange rates. 
6. Trade liberalisation.
7. Liberalisation of inward FDI: there was no con-
sensus about whether the capital account in general 
should be liberalised or regulated.
8. Privatisation. 
9. Deregulation.
10. Property rights.
Eight of these ten are used here to evaluate Ar-
gentinean policy orientation: Principles 2 and 10 will 
not be considered because they require deeper analy-
sis and some ad-hoc judgments to disentangle whether 
changes in these areas have moved policy orientations 
towards or away from the WC.
The point at which this policy review starts is 
somewhat arbitrary. It was important to have a suffi-
ciently long period to illustrate the historical aspects 
of policy fluctuations, but at the same time one not too 
long to have faded from individuals’ memories. On av-
erage firms included in current micro databases, such 
as the innovation survey, were founded in 1963. There-
fore, starting from 1963 should allow illustrating the 
macroeconomic context faced by the majority of firms 
currently producing in the country. 
Moreover, 1963 marked the nadir before the up-
turn to the autochthonous golden age, with the econ-
omy showing positive growth rates between 1964 and 
1974. During the period 1963 to mid-1974 GDP grew 
at an annual cumulative rate of 5%. This period then 
constituted the last economic boom before the eco-
nomic reactivation of the 1990s,6 which is the last 
period considered in this paper. However, while in 
the 1960s policies responded to heterodox principles 
in economic thought, in the 1990s these principles 
were primarily orthodox. In addition, it was during 
the 1960s that policy-makers started to be aware that 
stop-go cycles were impeding or at least slowing eco-
nomic growth, and were attempting to design policies 
to overcome the stop phases, which were usually re-
lated to balance of payments crises (Gerchunoff and 
Llach, 2003: 293).
Tables A.1 to A.6, in the Appendix, present chron-
ological information on political changes, starting from 
5. In the 1990s the Structural Adjustment Loans were generally known as SAPs and recently renamed the Poverty Reduction Strategy Initiative, presumably given the 
criticism these programmes received in terms of their failures to reduce poverty (see for example Stewart, 1995).
6. GDP showed positive growth rates between 1991 and 1998, and the annual cumulative rate of growth in that period was 5.7%.
|  36  |  Revista de Economía Política de Buenos Aires  |  año 3  |  vols. 5 y 6  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
the government of Arturo Illia (October 1963). They 
include a complete list of ministers for the economy 
and summarise the main aspects of macroeconomic 
policy-making in those areas7 included in the WC.8 The 
last column of the tables classifies time periods into or-
thodox and heterodox orientations according to whether 
decisions taken in these areas agreed or not (in general) 
with the recommendations of the WC. There were still 
some periods that do not allow a classification, either 
because there was no clear economic programme (just 
efforts to deal with the immediate short-term situa-
tion) or because the areas taken into account in this 
exercise showed opposite orientations. The informa-
tion in this column is summarised in Figure 1.
2.2. Radical Party, President Arturo Illia: 
1963-1966
Arturo Illia was president of Argentina for less 
than three years. He was a member of the Radical Party 
and was democratically elected, though through limited 
democratic procedures given that Perón, the working 
class leader, and his party had been proscribed since a 
military coup deposed Perón in 1955.9 The economic ori-
entation under Illia’s government was clearly heterodox: 
expansive fiscal and monetary policy, with credit alloca-
tion decided centrally. There were credit incentives to 
buy domestic products, incentives for non-traditional 
exports, and economic incentives for industrial promo-
tion. The exchange rate policy was a main milestone of 
Illia’s government. As early as April 1964 the government 
created a mechanism to avoid both national currency 
overvaluation (usually a consequence of fixed exchange 
rate regimes in inflationary economies) and foreign ex-
change instability (which is related to flexible exchange 
rate regimes in developing countries). The novelty was 
in adjusting the exchange rate periodically to the na-
tional inflation rate. In addition, controls were imposed 
on movement of international capital, in particular to 
discourage short-term inflows, and FDI was not treat-
7. In Tables A.1 to A.6 principles 1 and 3 are grouped under the heading of ‘fiscal policy’, principle 4 under ‘monetary policy’, principle 5 is named ‘exchange rate policy’, 
principle 6 is referred to as ‘trade policy’, principle 7 is taken more generally under the heading ‘capital movement’, principle 8 is called ‘privatisation’ and principle 9 
under the heading ‘regulation’.
8. These tables were built using information from the following sources: Basualdo, et al. (2002); De Pablo (1995); Escudé and Cisneros (2000); García Vázquez (1995); 
Gerchunoff and Llach (2003); Luna (1988); Heymann (2000); Mallon and Sourrouille (1973); and Rapoport (2000). 
9. Illia won with just 25% of the votes, the second largest (20%) political force being blank votes.
Figure 1
Summary of policy orientation from October 
1963 until December 2001
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law on oil exploration mentioned above was reversed, 
which opened the game to foreign investment in this 
strategic natural resource. Moreover, this government 
enjoyed the support of the IFIs. 
A student and workers’ movement known as the 
‘Cordobazo’ surfaced in 1968 and marked the begin-
ning of the end of Onganía’s government. The military 
government that followed maintained similar (some-
times more) orthodox policies, which were soon shown 
to be inefficient for controlling inflation in a context 
of political unrest and capital flight. In November 1970 
there was a change of Minister for the Economy, with a 
representative of the development school, Aldo Ferrer, be-
ing appointed. After a currency devaluation, exchange 
controls were reintroduced and heterodox policy mea-
sures such as incentives to buy domestic were once 
again touted. However, these measures did not elimi-
nate external restrictions, and a balance of payments 
crisis together with out-of-control inflation finished 
this government, the minister and even the ministry 
itself, as President Lanusse decided to discontinue the 
Ministry for the Economy. The government meanwhile 
devoted its energies to designing a way to leave the 
Presidency in democratic hands (with as low as pos-
sible political costs), and three different Secretaries of 
Finance in turn struggled to deal with short-term con-
tingencies (Gerchunoff and Llach, 2003: 330). 
2.4. Peronism, President Juan Domingo Perón 
(third Presidency): 1973-1976
In September 1973, Perón, with 62% of the votes, 
was elected President of Argentina for the third time. 
During his short mandate (he died while in office in 
July 1974) a heterodox economic programme, known as 
the “Pacto Social” (Social Agreement), was developed. 
The objective was to reduce expectations about infla-
tion through agreements between workers, firms and 
government. The government used its strong political 
support to carry out this plan, and prices and wages 
were ‘voluntarily’ frozen. This was the core of a policy 
package that worked acceptably for a year.10 The plan 
ed in the same way as domestic investment. The Illia 
government rescinded contracts that had been signed 
under the previous Radical government (i.e. Frondizi, 
Argentinean president from March 1958 till March 1962) 
with foreign oil companies, in order to invest in national 
oil exploration. Prices and wages were regulated, and 
policy-making decisions were taken independently of 
the IMF (Gerchunoff and Llach, 2003: 296-299). All these 
aspects classify Illia’s government as being heterodox, as 
shown in Table A.1 and Figure 1.
2.3. Military government: 1966-1973
Illia was obliged to step down in June 1966 as the 
result of a military coup, the self-styled Argentinean 
Revolution. Three military regimes were successively 
in power over the next seven years. The first was that 
of Juan Carlos Onganía, who was President from June 
1966 until May 1970, the second, Roberto Levingston 
until March 1971, and finally the Alejandro Lanusse 
regime, which restored power to a democratic govern-
ment in May 1973. The supporters of the Argentinean 
Revolution included advocates of economic liberalism 
as there were of different branches of nationalism. 
Therefore, the economic policies implemented during 
these seven years followed no consistent economic ori-
entation; only during Onganía’s government, and only 
six months after he took power, could the set of policies 
in place be said to be following a fairly consistent eco-
nomic programme. This programme was largely ortho-
dox with some idiosyncratic elements, especially in re-
spect of monetary and exchange rate policy. Exchange 
rate controls were suppressed and, after a strong cur-
rency devaluation, the exchange rate was fixed. There 
were no monetary restrictions, and money supply in-
creased pari passu with the decrease in expected infla-
tion. Public expenditure was reduced, in particular by 
reductions in the public sector workforce. In terms of 
trade policy, there were reductions in import tariffs, 
and non-traditional exports continued to be encour-
aged. Capital controls were relaxed, and many national 
firms were acquired by foreign capital. In addition, the 
10. The plan started when Cámpora (a Peronist) was elected president in early 1973. He was in office for only a few months when a law emendation enabled Perón 
himself to participate in open elections.
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also included some of the interventionist policies from 
Perón’s first Presidency (1946-1952), such as nationali-
sation of international trade, centralised allocation of 
credit, moderately expansive fiscal policy, and national-
ist speeches against FDI, alongside more recent policy 
acquisitions, such as decoupling the exchange rate (one 
official and fixed for trade and one decided in the finan-
cial markets), incentives for non-traditional exports, and 
efforts to open up new markets for traditional exports. 
Although in March 1974 there were already nega-
tive signs, after Perón’s death in July, political conflicts 
and struggles of self-interest between those that had 
previously supported the government marked the end 
of the “Pacto Social”. Inflation was once again out of con-
trol, and policy swung, with no economic coherence, to 
satisfy factions of society with opposing claims. Also, 
political violence surfaced between the left-wing guer-
rillas and para-military groups (supported by branches 
of the government). Thus, when President Isabel Perón 
(Perón´s wife, who was originally Vice-President) was 
deposed in March 1976 by what turned out to be the 
bloodiest military coup in Argentinean history, the 
population posed little resistance. 
2.5. Military government: 1976-1983
The years under dictatorship of the “Junta 
Militar”11 from 1976 to 1983 constituted the period of 
most horrific and systematic violation of human rights 
in Argentina. Thirty thousand people ‘disappeared’ 
and thousands of others fled the country to save their 
lives. Thus, in a context of seriously limited political 
and human rights, with the parliament closed and with 
a wholly newly appointed Supreme Court, in a period 
when a war was conducted against one of the world’s 
biggest powers (the Falklands war against the UK), it is 
not necessary to include the swings of economic poli-
cies to convey a picture of the arbitrary nature of na-
tional institutions, the consequent contextual instabil-
ity and the defensive flexibility that was necessary for 
survival, and this time, not just in the market.
The economic policies did not equate with stabil-
ity of any kind. During the first five years of military 
government, under Videla’s presidency, uncompromis-
ingly orthodox policies were implemented: restrictive 
fiscal12 and monetary policy, strong reduction in im-
port tariffs (although some quantitative restrictions 
remained), complete financial liberalisation, price 
deregulation after 1977, privatisation or liquidation of 
public companies (or public shares in mixed compa-
nies) especially in the manufacturing sector, etc.13 This 
was combined with exchange rate policies, ranging 
from flexible exchange rates in May 1978 to an ‘inno-
vative’ system in December 1979, called ‘La Tablita’ (a 
series of pre-announced devaluations) that attempted 
to align local inflation with international inflation, but 
instead triggered strong overvaluation of the national 
currency because the inflation rate was above the pre-
announced devaluation rate. 
The economic policies were supported and finan-
cially backed up by the IFIs including the IMF, the WB 
and the Inter American Development Bank (IADB). This 
whole process resulted in strong national de-industri-
alisation (or import restitution), accompanied by a dra-
matic change in the economic structure, from labour to 
capital and from small and medium-size independent 
enterprises to large conglomerates.14
Three more presidents from the military forces 
succeeded Videla, one of whom was deposed by a mili-
tary coup (Viola), another who resigned (Galtieri, after 
the Falklands war), with the third (Bignone) covering 
the transition to democratic elections and passing 
power to Alfonsín, a president from the Radical party, 
which was victorious in the elections for the first time 
since Peronism had ceased to be proscribed.
The policies introduced by these military presi-
dents were short-term and swinging, their common 
11. The “Junta Militar” was an agreement among the three branches of military power (army, navy and air force) to share power, alternating the head of the govern-
ment according to an agreed  schedule.
12. However, there was an increase in public infrastructure which particularly favoured the large national conglomerates (groups) in the country (Damill, 2005: 
169-170). 
13. For information on privatisations carried out from 1976 onwards see the web site of the Argentinean Ministry of Economy: http://mepriv.mecon.gov.ar/ and Ba-
sualdo (2002).
14. See Azpiazu (1986) and Schvarzer (1983).
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thread being the favouring of some groups over others. 
For eight months from April 1981, when Viola became 
President, the government tried various uncoordinated 
and unorthodox mechanisms to deal with the needs 
of some productive sectors (Kosacoff, 1996: 137). Inter-
est rates were regulated; there were several devalua-
tions; import tariffs increased; and an arrangement to 
nationalise private debt was implemented. Galtieri’s 
government reversed all these measures and returned 
to previous orthodoxy in policy design: financial liber-
alisation, flexible exchange rates, restrictive monetary 
policy, tariff reductions, etc. 
The government after Galtieri’s reversed this 
again, and reintroduced interventionist policies that 
favoured debtors, as Viola’s government had done one 
year earlier. The interest rate was regulated at lower 
than the inflation rate, so private debt was liquidated, 
with the general public paying for it through inflation 
tax. The government also compensated the banks with 
Central Bank loans offered at negative real interest rates 
(Gerchunoff and Llach, 2003: 377). At the same time, an 
arrangement was agreed about the exchange rate to al-
leviate the weight of foreign debt. Under this arrange-
ment, the Central Bank guaranteed an exchange rate 
for future repayments, as long as debtors managed to 
refinance their debt for at least one year. In sum, the 
financial reforms overseen by Domingo Cavallo, the 
then president of the Central Bank, meant alleviation 
for the private and financial sectors and greater weight 
on the public sector, which continued to incur new 
debts through different mechanisms.15 In addition, at 
the end of 1982, a new regulation from the Central Bank 
enabled a plain conversion of private debt into national 
debt, as the government offered a public bond in for-
eign currency to cover the difference between what the 
debtor paid in pesos at the pre-set exchange rate, and 
the actual debt in current foreign currency.
Therefore, the democratic government inherited 
not just the public debt taken to finance the public 
deficits of an illegitimate government, but also foreign 
private debt which had been nationalised by different 
policy arrangements, for which Cavallo, who ten years 
later was to create the Convertibility Plan, shared an 
important responsibility. 
All in all, economic policies carried out during 
this period brought about a concentration of economic 
power in a handful of foreign enterprises, big conglom-
erates, and foreign creditors, all of whom as a conse-
quence increased their influence on national policy-
making (Basualdo et al., 2002: 7).16, 17
2.6. Radical party, President Raúl Alfonsín: 
1983-1989
The Radical party government (1983-1989) was a 
period of great instability in terms of policy orienta-
tion. Figure 1 shows that, over a period of 39 years I 
could identify 19 policy regimes ranging from hetero-
doxy to orthodoxy, six of which occurred under Raúl Al-
fonsín’s presidency. The fight against inflation raged 
throughout his term of office. Although various reci-
pes (from rather opposing points of view about what 
causes inflation) were attempted, Alfonsín had to re-
sign before the end of his mandate, in the middle of a 
hyperinflationary crisis. 
The arm-wrestling between the need to grow fast-
er to fulfil the expectations that the return to democ-
racy demanded, and the need to agree with the IFIs 
to enable a roll-over of the external debt, by and large 
marked the switch in policy orientation in this period. 
The indecision of the ruling government18 did not con-
15. See Basualdo (1987) for a review of capital flows affecting the public sector during the military government.
16. In an article in a management journal, researchers from the Austral University in Argentina recommend managers of multinational firms willing to do business in 
Argentina to seek support from, and establish ties to, national business groups. In their words, “(w)hile Argentina still rebuilds its financial, democratic, and judicial 
institutions, establishing such ties is likely to help firms increase their chances of not only avoiding unpleasant surprises from latest macro and micro economic policy 
changes but also influencing their outcome. (...) these ties are the mechanisms through which firms can help influence policies so as to benefit society, citizens, the 
local economic and social institutions and, of course, the firm’s own chance of survival, profitability, and future international competitiveness” (Carrera et al., 2003: 
42, my underscores).
17. It is interesting to note that the IMF gave political support to these policies in approving a stand-by credit at the end of 1982. To evaluate the political weight of this 
action appropriately it should be remembered that it occurred just months after the Falklands war (Escudé and Cisneros, 2000: XI: 54), with the obvious consequences 
that this had for Argentinean international relations.
18. Alfonsín won the election with 52% of the votes, which was a historic win for the Radical party given that it was the first time it had been victorious against the 
Peronist party. Thus, despite the likely political difficulties of governing Argentina without the support of Peronism, it must be acknowledged that the Alfonsín govern-
ment did not start its mandate with weak political support.
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tribute to policy consistency or endurance. 
The government started with a heterodox pro-
gramme mirroring that of the Illia government (Gerc-
hunoff and Llach, 2003: 394), which soon became infla-
tionary. An agreement with the IMF in December 1984 
redirected policy to an orthodox path: restrictive fiscal 
and monetary policy plus devaluation of the national 
currency.
The landmark in policy-making of Alfonsín’s 
government came soon after this with a heterodox 
programme known as the “Plan Austral” (June 1985 
– March 1986). The plan developed out of the idea 
that fighting inflation meant dealing with inflation-
ary expectations. Therefore, the key measures were 
regulation of nominal variables: prices were frozen, 
the exchange rate was fixed, interest rates were regu-
lated, and there was no printing of money to finance 
public deficits. The programme was successful for a 
few months: GDP started growing while inflation de-
creased. 
However, the government soon felt the need for 
liberalisation, in part due to difficulties in keeping the 
fiscal deficit under control when tariffs from public 
companies were frozen and inflation was not yet total-
ly eliminated. However, the main reason was the fear 
that delaying liberalisation would be extremely harm-
ful: the government wished neither to pay the cost 
of currency overvaluation nor to take the risk of the 
hyperinflation (Gerchunoff and Llach, 2003: 402) that 
could occur if prices were liberalised after being kept 
artificially frozen for a long time. 
Therefore, a monetarist solution to inflation (re-
strictive monetary policy) was put into practice, but 
with no positive results; and some months later a sec-
ond price freezing exercise occurred. 
In July 1987 a new agreement with the IMF estab-
lished the conditions that drove the policy orientation 
back to orthodoxy, but this time with a much broader 
scope: it included measures of financial liberalisation, 
flexible exchange rates, and a first attempt to priva-
tise public companies (which had been blocked by the 
Peronist party in the Congress). Its lack of success, es-
pecially in reducing inflation, obliged the government 
to try other solutions. The persistently high inflation, 
which had started in 1974, had created patterns of cop-
ing behaviour, which were embedded in norms and 
rules at national level (e.g. short-term financial con-
tracts, automatic monthly indexation of wages, etc.), 
and were therefore not only hard to break but had 
become a source of instability and uncertainty (Da-
mill, 2005: 166). Moreover, according to Damill (2005: 
186-188), at the end of 1986, there was an increase in 
defensive reactions (partly due to the lack of evident 
success in policies adopted) which left the government 
with little space to manoeuvre.
Politically isolated in parliament, with very low 
credibility rates, and with most economic indicators 
against them, the government chose what was viable 
in the short term. In April 1988 it cancelled payments 
of public foreign debts (interests and principal). In Au-
gust 1988, it made agreements with some of the big 
enterprises to reduce the increases in their prices and 
in exchange the government promised a reduction in 
valued added tax (VAT).19 This plan failed quite quickly, 
and by the summer of 1989 the country was already 
suffering from hyperinflation. The economic crisis 
soon triggered a social and political crisis that obliged 
Alfonsín to resign.
2.7. Peronist Party, President Carlos Menem: 
1989-1999
The landmark in Carlos Menem’s policymaking 
was the Convertibility Plan created by Domingo Cavallo 
in April 1991, which was celebrated by the economic 
establishment, both nationally and internationally. 
The plan finally succeeded in stabilising the national 
currency, and it was only then that the WC recommen-
dations were largely implemented. Seven years after 
the plan was established, Argentina was being pre-
sented by the IFIs as an example for the world. Michel 
Camdessus, Managing Director of IMF, stated in a Press 
Conference at the end of 1998:
19. According to Basualdo, et al. (2002), this indicates that the Radical government prioritised the interest of local economic groups and foreign companies producing 
in the country, neglecting the interests of foreign creditors. 
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It is true that in many respects the experience of Ar-
gentina in recent years has been exemplary, including 
in particular the adoption of the proper strategy at the 
beginning of the 1990s and the very courageous adap-
tation of it when the tequila crisis put the overall sub-
continent at risk of major turmoil. It is noteworthy that 
Argentina was probably the first in reacting by imme-
diately strengthening its policy stance and, in particu-
lar, pushing ahead with banking sector reform, which 
of course turned out afterward to be one of the main 
elements of trouble in other parts of the world. Nota-
ble, too, are the efforts of Argentina since that time to 
continue its excellent compliance with the performance 
criteria under our arrangements and much progress in 
implementation of the structural reforms. 
So, clearly, Argentina has a story to tell the world: a 
story which is about the importance of fiscal discipline, 
of structural change, and of monetary policy rigorously 
maintained. Of course, in the case of Argentina, in the 
framework of its convertibility plan, the basic principle 
that you cannot solve problems by relaxation of mon-
etary discipline has demonstrated its virtues. (Camdes-
sus, October 1, 1998)
Menem’s era showed greater stability in terms of 
policy orientation, with policymaking clearly dominat-
ed by orthodoxy as defined in this paper. The Convert-
ibility period started after two years of failed attempts 
that culminated in the second hyperinflation in 1990. 
The first two Ministers for the Economy were manag-
ing directors of one of the biggest conglomerates in the 
country (Bunge & Born). Erman Gonzalez succeeded 
them and was in office when the first and most con-
troversial privatisations took place. Domingo Cavallo 
replaced him in March 1991. 
The Convertibility Plan was launched in April 1991, 
and was defined as a ‘shock’ programme, openly aligned 
to the WC: Argentina would restrict its attempt to carry 
out monetary policy and would restrict its fiscal policy, 
as the way to achieve macroeconomic stability (Damill, 
2005: 203). The main characteristic of the plan was to 
keep the exchange rate fixed by law, under a currency 
board regime. Given the inertia of inflation, apprecia-
tion of the national currency was strong during the first 
years of the Plan (Escudé et al., 2001: 15). In total during 
the Convertibility period, the national currency appre-
ciated by 60% in real terms against the currencies of a 
pool of trade partners (Escudé et al., 2001: 18).
Although the currency board regime was the most 
prominent feature, the Menem government was com-
mitted to most conditions in the WC. Most public com-
panies (and all public utilities) were privatised, Basel 
agreements on financial liberalisation were carried out 
fully, there were no restrictions on capital movement, 
FDI was given equal treatment, trade liberalisation 
(which started during the Erman Gonzalez period) was 
speeded up, industrial promotion regimes were elimi-
nated, and flexibility in the labour market was initiated 
in the public sector. At the same time, the fiscal deficit 
was reduced, although it should be noted that during 
the first years of this period, there was a very impor-
tant injection of money via privatisations.20
According to Basualdo, et al. (2002: 9) the privati-
sation process, which started in 1990, had strategic im-
portance for the sustainability of the regime. The au-
thors argued that this was the first time that the inter-
ests of both foreign creditors and powerful local groups 
(i.e. foreign companies and conglomerates) were satis-
fied by a single policy measure. On the one hand, the 
privatisations were a tool to pay foreign debt. On the 
other hand, in most cases there were foreign firms and 
big conglomerates the counterparts of the privatisa-
tion of public enterprises, which were businesses that 
involved low entrepreneurial risks. As a consequence, 
during the Convertibility Regime there were fewer of 
those interest struggles that had destabilised previous 
economic policies. 
The context was favourable for attracting for-
eign capital, as international interest rates were low. 
This allowed the exchange rate to remain fixed, while 
avoiding external restrictions on financing trade defi-
cits. The Convertibility Plan enabled and promoted 
the dollarisation of internal financial relationships, 
20. See Table A.3.5 for a more detailed review of the specific policies implemented in the areas included in the WC.
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which year after year significantly increased the costs 
of leaving Convertibility behind.21
In 1994 a constitutional reform enabled Menem to 
participate in the general elections for a second period. 
He won with a large margin and remained in power 
until 1999. Domingo Cavallo continued as Minister for 
the Economy but was replaced in 1996 by the former 
president of the Central Bank, Roque Fernández. 
The economy grew quickly until the Mexican 
crisis at the end of 1994. A rapid agreement with the 
IMF put a stop to capital flight, and in 1996 the growth 
rate of GDP was again positive. It should be noted that 
despite Argentinean macroeconomic policy-making 
being largely aligned with WC recommendations, this 
did not help to reduce the stock of public debt, and 
public debt increased during the Menem Period by 
145.5%.22
Moreover, by the end of the decade the social 
and political climate was not promising. Unemploy-
ment increased sharply,23 more people were suffer-
ing poverty,24 and all public sector services (especially 
health and education) deteriorated dramatically. 
In addition, suspected and proven cases of corrup-
tion were spread over many public entities. Political 
crimes and terrorist attacks against the Jewish com-
munity alarmed the population. In this climate, it is 
not surprising that the Peronist party was defeated in 
the 1999 general elections.
2.8. Radical party and allies, President 
Fernando de la Rúa: 1999-2001
The new president of the ‘Alliance’, which was 
formed by the Radical party and some other factions 
from the centre-left wing, was Fernando de la Rúa, a 
politician from the Radical party.
His government did not attempt to change the 
status quo. Quite the contrary, it remained stubbornly 
anchored to the currency board regime, which had 
been shown to be unsustainable (or extremely costly) 
for at least two years. The currency board regime de-
pended on inflows of capital from abroad, which were 
covered at the beginning by privatisations (via recovery 
of public bonds), then by FDI, and throughout by fresh 
funds from the IFIs. 
However, in their campaign the Alliance had 
promised to stick to the currency board regime and 
they did so religiously. Convertibility and the govern-
ment both fell at the end of 2001. 
Both this, and the previous, government viewed 
abandoning the convertibility of the peso as a signal 
that would weaken credibility of the regime on the 
whole and would lead to defensive practices, includ-
ing speculation against the national currency, which 
would sooner or later unleash a generalised crisis. 
Therefore, contrary to what would have been optimal 
in strict economic sense, both governments adopted a 
series of second-best policies that amended the nega-
tive effects of currency appreciation (e.g. increased tar-
iffs on imports in 1997 and again in 2001), and other 
policies -or policy intentions- that would convince the 
public of the Government’s commitment to defend the 
economic regime (e.g. privatised companies had dol-
lar denominated fares which increased according to US 
inflation, dollar denominated government bonds, dol-
lar denominated reserve requirements, fiscal austerity 
-‘deficit zero’ policy in 2000-, etc.). Signalling had been 
important since the beginning of the Convertibility 
Plan (recall that it was designed as a shock programme 
in many different policy areas to cancel out pessimis-
tic expectations). However, in the last years of its life, 
policy-making was to a large extent conditioned by 
signalling; in order to transmit signals of commitment 
to the established economic regimes, the government 
imposed ever larger rigidities to the system that, at the 
end of the day, [only] increased the cost of abandoning 
the regime (Galiani et al., 2003: 22).
21. For example, in 2001, 75% of deposits and almost 80% of credits were nominated in dollars.
22. According to statistics provided by the Minister for the Economy of Argentina, the public debt in millions of dollars was 144.453 in 2001, which represented around 
50% of GDP in 2001 and was 5 times the size of Argentinean exports in 2001 (See website of: Argentinean Finance Secretariat, 2005). For a very detailed analysis of 
the Argentinean indebtedness process during the 1990s see Kulfas and Schorr (2003).
23. According to the World Development Indicators produced by the WB, 5.8% of the population was unemployed in 1991 but this reached to 17.4% in 2001. In other 
words, unemployment tripled from the beginning to the end of the Convertibility era.   
24. The same source reveals that 5.8% of the population were living on less than $2 per day in 1992 (no data available for 1991), while in 2001 the number rose by 
148%: at the end of the Convertibility Period, the number of people living on less than $2 a day accounted for 14.3% of the population.
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2.9. Policy swings: Concluding Remarks
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the policy 
changes discussed above. Orthodox policies have dom-
inated Argentinean policy-making: in total, from 1963 
to 2001 24 years were governed by orthodox policies, 
nine years by heterodox policies, and for six years no 
clear programme can be identified. Policy cycles were 
longer in orthodox periods (on average three and half 
years) than heterodox periods (on average only one 
year). Although less marked, this also applies to the 
pre-1990 period (i.e. up to the Menem government, 
which represented more than one decade of orthodox 
policy). 
In sum, it was showed that policy swings are one 
of the main characteristics of Argentinean policy-mak-
ing. Since 1963 until 2001 there were 19 different policy 
regimes, which usually implied a dramatic switch in 
policy orientation from heterodoxy to ortodoxy (and vice 
versa). Not surprisingly Argentina was in seventh place 
among 106 countries in terms of variability in macro-
economic policy between years 1970 and 1997 (Spiller 
and Tommasi, 2003: 383). 
3. Indicators of macroeconomic 
volatility since the 1970s: a comparison 
between the UK and Argentina 
3.1. The scope of the macroeconomic data 
analysis
As shown in the previous section the history of 
policy orientation in Argentina is very rich. By 2003, 
people in their 30s have experienced many different 
economic recipes, but little economic growth: GDP per 
capita in 2003 was lower than it was in 1973 (Figure 2). 
This section describes the volatility of the Argen-
tinean economy. However, I do not claim that Argen-
tinean firms suffered from greater uncertainty than 
firms producing in some other countries (for instance 
other Latin American countries). 
As there is no absolute measure of volatility that 
would allow classifying Argentina as a country whose 
volatility was high, the UK has been used as a bench-
mark. The UK was chosen because, albeit in the devel-
oped world, it was also long considered a relatively vola-
tile economy. What is important is to achieve an empiri-
cal illustration that Argentinean volatility was high. 
Table 1
Time duration of different policy orientations
 Period  Oct 1963 - Dec 2001
 Total Average Cycle
 Months Years Months Years
Orthodox orientation 291 24 42 3,5
Heterodox orientation 105 9 13 1,1
No clear programme 66 6 17 1,4
Total 495 39 
 Period  Oct 1963 - June 1989
 Total  Average Cycle
 Months Years Months Years
Orthodox orientation 141 12 24 2,0
Heterodox orientation 102 9 13 1,1
No clear programme 66 6 17 1,4
Total 309 26  
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On the other hand, for GDP, exports, imports, the 
openness coefficient and domestic prices, the rates of 
growth are calculated with respect to the same quarter 
in the previous year, defined as:
quartert h       wit          
x
xg
t
t
tx =−=
−
1
4
4 with t = quarter
3.2. Volatility as a macroeconomic outcome
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for vari-
ables representing macroeconomic outcomes: growth 
in real GDP, in exports, in imports, in prices and rela-
tive prices.
It can be seen that the Argentinean economy is 
far more volatile than the British economy. Standard 
deviations for all variables in Table 2 are significantly 
larger (at 0.01% level) for Argentina than for the UK. 
Moreover, the coefficient of variation is always higher 
for Argentina than for the UK. 
From Figure 3 it can be seen that the growth rate 
of real GDP fluctuates widely for both countries, but is 
more extreme for Argentina in both boom periods and 
recessions. It is also apparent that Argentinean growth 
cycles are somewhat shorter than the British.
Figures 4 and 5 depict growth rates for foreign 
trade, respectively imports and exports. Volatility is 
clearly higher for Argentina in both cases, but while 
Most of the data in this section come from the In-
ternational Financial Statistics published by the IMF. For Ar-
gentina these data are complemented with information 
from INDEC (National Institute of Statistics and Census) 
and the ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin Ameri-
can and the Caribbean) office in Argentina. Quarterly 
data since the 1960s were analysed.
The empirical evidence is organised as follows. 
Firstly, I present indicators that account for macroeco-
nomic volatility, that is, volatility as a macroeconomic 
outcome (sub-section 3.2). The second step is to illus-
trate the possible sources of such volatile outcomes: 
was it those variables that were largely under govern-
ment control (sub-section 3.3), or was the volatility an 
imported product resulting from globalisation (sub-
section 3.4).
For some variables, volatility is measured as rates 
of growth, which are calculated differently depending 
on whether seasonality is expected to be important for 
the variable under analysis.
The quarter-to-quarter rate of growth is calculat-
ed for: nominal interest rates, money supply, exchange 
rates and terms of trade. It is defined as: 
 quarterh t       wit          1
1
=−=
−t
t
tx x
xg with t = quarter
Figure 2
Annual GDP and GDP per capita, Argentina 1901-2003
Millions of Pesos of 1950
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Source: INDEC – Argentina, ECLAC Office Buenos Aires & IMF Financial Statistics
Indicator Country Years Quarters Mean Median SD Max Min CV
Growth rates ARG 1969-2003 139 0,020 0,020 0,060 0,140 -0,160 3,340
of Real GDP  UK 1969-2003 138 0,020 0,020 0,020 0,110 -0,040 0,970
Growth rate ARG 1957-2003 183 0,100 0,070 0,220 0,960 -0,400 2,250
of Exports FOB UK 1957-2003 182 0,080 0,070 0,120 0,580 -0,190 1,420
Growth rate ARG 1957-2003 183 0,100 0,020 0,350 1,390 -0,640 3,430
of Imports CIF UK 1957-2003 182 0,090 0,070 0,120 0,570 -0,170 1,450
Growth rates of Consumer ARG 1957-2003 183 2,960 0,350 12,900 140,300 -0,020 4,350
Price Index (CPI) UK 1957-2003 183 0,060 0,040 0,050 0,270 0,000 0,840
Growth rates of Producer ARG 1960-2003 171 2,990 0,340 13,020 148,820 -0,060 4,350
Price Index (PPI) UK 1960-2003 171 0,050 0,040 0,060 0,250 -0,080 1,050
Relative Prices CPI/PPI ARG 1979-2003 99 1,580 1,460 0,520 2,300 0,780 0,330
 UK 1979-2003 99 1,000 1,000 0,070 1,200 0,910 0,070
Table 2
Macroeconomic outcomes
Figure 3
Real GDP
Rates of growth same quarter previous year 1969-2003
exports for the UK and Argentina tend to converge, 
imports do not. This might indicate that the capacity 
to export in Argentina is influenced to a larger extent 
by world market conditions, while importing is associ-
ated more with domestic factors. Import booms occur 
in the go phase of stop-go cycles (the correlation coef-
ficient between imports and GDP growth is 0.73, while 
for exports it is 0.12), which has traditionally generated 
a balance of payments crisis that brings the economy 
to a standstill.
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Figure 4
Imports in US$
Rates of growth same quarter previous year 1957-2003
Figure 5
Exports in US$
Rates of growth same quarter previous year 1957-2003
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25. Univariate outliers were detected following Hadi’s (1992) method, at the 1% level of significance. These outliers do not originate from measurement errors and 
therefore are not real noise. On the contrary, these extreme historical episodes might have had a persistent impact on behaviour in Argentina, as they must have pushed 
people to the edge of their behaviour patterns, and therefore strictly speaking should be considered in the analysis. However, as they do contaminate the statistics and 
make graphical representation less revealing of the volatility norm I decided to drop them. In any case, we need to take into account that, besides what is seen in the 
figures, there was a super-volatility that might have actually deepened the tendencies in behaviour. 
26. PPI can be considered as a proxy for the price of tradable goods, while CPI is a proxy for the price of non-tradable goods; with currency appreciation the former 
becomes relatively cheaper whereas the latter becomes relatively more expensive. 
Figure 6
CPI: Consumer Price Index 
Rates of growth same quarter previous year 1958-2003 without extreme values
Figures 6 to 9 show the behaviour of domestic pric-
es. In the 1970s and 1980s Argentina featured in the list 
of high-inflation countries. The comparison with the UK 
in Figures 3.6 Consumer Price Index (CPI) and 3.7 Produc-
er Price Index (PPI) is totally dominated by these high-
inflationary periods, even after dropping the extreme 
values.25 More interesting are Figures 8 and 9: the for-
mer depicts the PPI index for the period under analysis 
(1992-2001), which was a period of stability in Argentina. 
Still the Argentinean variation is more pronounced and 
shows significantly larger standard deviations. Figure 9 
depicts relative prices and the ratio can be seen to have 
increased in Argentina throughout the nineties, which 
is a side effect of currency appreciation.26 
Figure 7
PPI: Producer Price Index
Rates of growth same quarter previous year 1979-2003 without extreme values
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Figure 8
PPI: Producer Price Index
Rates of growth same quarter previous years 1992-2001 -not inflationary period-
Figure 9
Relative prices (CPI/PPI) 
1979-2003 
Table 3 summarises the measures of volatility as 
a macroeconomic outcome: the standard deviations of 
the Argentinean series of real GDP are in fact double 
those for the UK.27 Moreover, negative growth occurred 
in Argentina for about 40% of the time periods, while 
in the UK the probability of negative growth is just 15% 
for GDP and 18% for GDP per capita.
Finally, the length of economic cycles is examined 
using periodograms.28 A periodogram graphs the spec-
tral amplitude of a series. Peaks represent the length of 
time of each of the cycles that are verified. Given the 
technique used, once a cycle is identified it is filtered 
for the identification of longer cycles (that is to say that 
if a cycle of four years is identified, it is obvious that cy-
27. Given the deep crisis that Argentina underwent in 2001 the indicators were calculated for 1970-2000 as well as 1970-2002.
28. Removing the irregular variations using the Tukey-Hamming method softened the original periodograms.
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Table 3
Indicators of GDP Volatility
cles of eight, twelve, etc. years will also exist, however 
they will not inevitably appear as peaks in the graph). 
The y-axis shows the spectral density that reflects the 
intensity.29 Therefore a series with low values of spec-
tral density could be interpreted as a soft or acyclical 
series. Similarly, a series showing peaks uniformly dis-
tributed over successive periods would imply that the 
variability is random. 
Periodograms were built using annual and quar-
terly data for both countries’ GDP growth rates30 for the 
period 1969-2002 (Figures 10 to 14). The first point high-
lighted by the graphs is that the lengths of Argentinean 
29. However, two things must be taken account of: firstly, the values of the spectral density are not independent of the units of measurement; and secondly, when the 
x-axis is time, the periodograms will show an implicit positive trend and therefore the intensity must be evaluated relative to the length of the period.
30. For quarterly data the rates of growth were calculated for the same quarter in the previous year.
Figure 10
GDP growth in Argentina: 1969-2002
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Figure 11
GDP growth in UK: 1969-2002
cycles are much more erratic than the lengths of Brit-
ish cycles (i.e. it is more difficult to identify peaks for 
Argentina). For the UK, cycles last approximately seven 
years (Figure 11) or thirty quarters (Figure 13). Given the 
randomness attached to the periodicity of Argentinean 
series, it is more difficult to find systematic cycles, but 
where they are detectable they persist for only around 
three years (Figure 10) or 12 quarters (Figure 12). If we 
analyse a longer time series, for instance 1930-2002, 
we find similar patterns: randomness and short cycles 
(less than four years in Figure 14).
Figure 12
GDP growth in Argentina: 1969-2002 
